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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this bankruptcy appeal, the issue is whether plaintiffs 
should have obtained a stay under S 363(m) of the 
Bankruptcy Code before appealing an assumption and an 
assignment under S 365. See 11 U.S.C.S 363(m) (1994). 
 
This appeal arises from the District Court's affirmance of 
the Bankruptcy Court's order approving the assumption of 
eight physician employment contracts by the Chapter 11 
Trustee of a bankrupt health care system and their 
assignment to another hospital.1 Contending their 
employment contracts were not assignable, the physicians 
appealed. 
 
I. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Allegheny Health, Education and Research 
Foundation ("AHERF "), the parent corporation, managed a 
multi-entity healthcare network in Pittsbur gh and 
Philadelphia. After a decade of acquisitions, the health 
system grew to more than fifty not-for -profit corporations 
that operated health care, educational and r esearch 
institutions. The enterprises included Allegheny University 
Medical Practices, Allegheny University of the Health 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 157 and the 
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal of the 
bankruptcy order under 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). We exercise jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 158(d) over the district court's final judgment in 
bankruptcy and 28 U.S.C. S 1291 over any final decision by the district 
court. We review the bankruptcy court'sfindings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law under a plenary 
standard. In re New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1138 (2000). Because the district court sits as an 
appellate court in bankruptcy cases, our review of its decision is 
plenary. 
In re Lan Assocs. XI, L.P., 192 F .3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Sciences, Allegheny General Hospital, Allegheny University 
Hospital-East, Centennial Hospital, Allegheny Singer 
Research Institute, Allegheny University Medical Center, 
and The Medical College of Pennsylvania-Hahnemann 
University. Especially relevant here wer e AHERF physician 
practice plans located in the Pittsburgh ar ea. 
 
Plaintiffs-appellants, Dr. John Cinicola and seven 
primary care physicians, operate the North Allegheny 
Internal Medicine medical practice in several locations 
around Pittsburgh.2 Between 1995 and 1997, the 
physicians signed contracts with Allegheny Integrated 
Health Group (now Allegheny University Medical Practices), 
and The Medical College of Pennsylvania-Hahnemann 
University (now Allegheny University of the Health Sciences) 
--both AHERF affiliates. 
 
After AHERF incurred significant losses, many of its 
affiliates and hospitals in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh filed 
for bankruptcy on July 21, 1998.3 Some months after his 
confirmation, William Scharf fenberger, AHERF 's Chapter 
11 trustee, together with some non-debtor AHERF affiliates, 
filed an emergency application with the Bankruptcy Court 
to approve a settlement agreement. For our purposes, the 
germane provisions of the settlement agr eement involved 
the sale of assets and the assignment of executory 
contracts, for over $25,000,000, to the Western 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance. To assume control of 
several of AHERF 's not-for-profit institutions that did not 
file for bankruptcy, in particular Allegheny General 
Hospital, the settlement agreement substituted the Western 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The other plaintiffs are Bonnie K. Case, M.D.; Philip F. Rabinowitz, 
M.D.; Michael Farrell, M.D.; Michele R. Mathews-Mlakar, D.O.; Marsha 
Fino, M.D.; Elliot Smith, M.D.; and Hubert Shick, M.D. The defendants- 
appellees are AHERF 's Chapter 11 trustee and the Western 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance along with Allegheny General Hospital. 
 
3. The debtor affiliates consisted of Allegheny University of the Health 
Sciences, Allegheny University Medical Practices, Allegheny Hospitals- 
Centennial, and Allegheny University Hospitals-East. Nonetheless, some 
affiliated organizations in Pittsbur gh, such as Allegheny General 
Hospital, did not file for bankruptcy. These not-for-profit corporate 
affiliates in Pittsburgh included Allegheny General Hospital, Allegheny 
Singer Research Institute, and Allegheny University Medical Centers. 
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Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance for AHERF as the 
institutions' sole voting member.4  The settlement agreement 
also provided for the assignment of the physicians' 
employment contracts from Allegheny University Medical 
Practices and Allegheny University of the Health Sciences to 
the Western Pennsylvania Healthcar e Alliance, which at the 
time had no affiliation with AHERF. 
 
In response, the physicians filed omnibus objections with 
the Bankruptcy Court alleging the proposed assumption 
and assignment of their contracts to the Western 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance--without their consent-- 
violated their employment agreements pr ohibiting 
assignment to a non-affiliate of AHERF. 5 Moreover, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance assumed control of 
certain AHERF affiliates through the substitution of the Western 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance for AHERF as the sole member of these 
affiliates. In nonprofit corporations, members generally play a role 
similar to shareholders in for-profit corporations. See Howard L.Oleck 
& Martha E. Stewart, Nonprofit Corporations, Organizations & 
Associations S 240 (6th ed. 1994); Robin Dimieri & Stephen Weiner, The 
Public Interest and Governing Boar ds of Nonprofit Health Care 
Institutions, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1029, 1045 (1981). For this reason, the 
acquisition of a nonprofit corporation's membership interest is 
comparable to the purchase of stock in a business. Paul R. DeMuro, 
Corporate Structure Company Issues in M&A T ransactions, and Special 
Issues for Physician Practice Management Companies , in Health Care 
M&A 1999: How to Structure the Transaction, at 165 (PLI Corporate Law 
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B0-009J, 1999). By contrast, 
however, the members of a nonprofit corporation also manage and 
control the corporation. Id. at 164-65. In this case, AHERF was the sole 
member of its affiliates and the sale of its memberships interests to the 
Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance effected a complete change of 
control. 
 
5. The physicians' contracts provided: 
 
       This agreement, and your rights and obligations hereunder, may not 
       be assigned by you. This agreement, and MCP-HU's [(The Medical 
       College of Pennsylvania-Hahnemann University)] rights and 
       obligations hereunder, may be assigned and delegated, from time to 
       time, by MCP-HU to AHERF, or to any other subsidiary of AHERF 
       . . . . 
 
For the doctors working for Allegheny University of the Health Sciences 
[(AUHS)], AUHS is substituted for MCP-HU in their contracts. 
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contesting Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance's 
financial viability, the physicians asserted adequate 
assurance of Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance's 
future performance of their contracts had not been 
provided as required by S 365(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
See 11 U.S.C. S 365(f)(2)(B) (trustee may assign executory 
contracts only if "adequate assurance of futur e performance 
by the assignee of such contract or lease is pr ovided, 
whether or not there has been default in such contract or 
lease"). After holding a non-evidentiary hearing on July 22, 
1999, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order the following 
day, July 23, approving the settlement agr eement ("the 
First Order"), but deferred deciding the assumption and 
assignment of the physicians' contracts in or der to address 
their objections. 
 
At a non-evidentiary hearing on July 29, 1999 to 
consider the physicians' objections, the Bankruptcy Court 
allowed the trustee to orally amend the settlement 
agreement to permit the physicians' contracts to be 
assigned to Allegheny General Hospital, at the time an 
AHERF affiliate.6 This substitution was critical because the 
contracts explicitly prohibited assignment to an entity, like 
the Western Pennsylvania Healthcar e Alliance, not affiliated 
with AHERF. After the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court 
authorized the assumption of the physicians' contracts and 
their assignment to Allegheny General Hospital ("the 
Second Order"). Later that same day, the trustee assigned 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dr. Cinicola's contract differed slightly and provided: 
 
       No assignment of this Agreement or the rights and obligations 
       hereunder shall be valid without the specific written consent of 
both 
       parties hereto, except that this Agreement may be assigned by MCP- 
       HU or AIHG [(Allegheny Integrated Health Gr oup)] to any parent, 
       subsidiary or affiliated corporation without prior approval of 
[the] 
       Physician . . . . 
 
6. The Bankruptcy Court did not issue an or der approving this 
amendment to the settlement agreement. Despite the Bankruptcy 
Court's earlier approval of the settlement agr eement, Allegheny General 
Hospital remained an AHERF affiliate because the Western Pennsylvania 
Healthcare Alliance had not yet closed on the agreement. 
 
                                6 
  
the contracts to Allegheny General Hospital. The W estern 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance then closed on the 
settlement agreement on August 3, 1999, substituting the 
Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance for AHERF as the 
sole and controlling member of Allegheny General Hospital. 
 
Without seeking a stay, the physicians appealed the 
Bankruptcy Court's Second Order to the District Court on 
August 5, 1999. As noted, the trustee and the W estern 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance closed on the settlement 
agreement two days earlier. Befor e the District Court ruled 
on their appeal, however, the physicians ter minated their 
employment with Allegheny General Hospital ef fective 
October 28, 1999. On February 29, 2000, the District Court 
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's Second Or der which 
assigned the employment agreements to Allegheny General 
Hospital. The physicians then appealed the assumption and 
assignment to this Court. 
 
Because the sale cannot be reversed, the physicians seek 
vacation of the Bankruptcy Court's order appr oving the 
assumption and assignment of their employment contracts. 
Appellees contend the physicians' claims are 
constitutionally moot because the sale has been 
consummated and statutorily moot under S 363(m) because 
the physicians failed to obtain a stay pending appeal. 
 
As noted, the physicians unilaterally terminated their 
contracts with Allegheny General Hospital, now a W estern 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance affiliate. It became clear 
at oral argument that the physicians seek to invalidate the 
assignment of their employment contracts to avoid the 
noncompetition clauses in their contracts that Allegheny 
General Hospital would now assert.7 The noncompetition 
clauses prohibit the physicians from working anywhere 
"within a five (5) mile radius of any medical practice 
location at which . . . [they] provided primary care services" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Allegheny General Hospital's general counsel r epresented to one of the 
plaintiffs' attorneys that the hospital would enforce the noncompete 
clauses in the physicians' contracts. See Letter from Jerry J. Fedele, 
Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Allegheny General Hospital, 
to Edwin Klett, attorney for several plaintif fs, Klett, Leiber, Rooney & 
Schorling 1 (March 17, 2000) (Reply Br. of appellants at Ex. A). 
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for AHERF or its affiliates. The covenants ar guably bar the 
physicians from joining Allegheny General Hospital's main 
competitor in Pittsburgh and terminate on October 28, 
2001, "two (2) years after the last date" of their 
employment. Id. When the noncompetition clauses expire, 
the physicians concede their appeal becomes 
constitutionally moot. 
 
II. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL MOOTNESS 
 
Because the physicians unilaterally terminated their 
employment, the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance 
and the trustee contend the physicians' appeal is 
constitutionally moot. In the absence of curr ent 
employment contracts, appellees assert there r emains 
neither a claim to adjudicate nor relief to grant. 
 
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the 
exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a 
case or controversy. DeFunis v. Odegaar d, 416 U.S. 312, 
316 (1974); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d 
Cir. 1993). Mootness derives from Article III's prohibition 
against federal courts issuing advisory opinions. North 
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Presbytery of 
N.J. of the Orthodox Presbyterian Chur ch v. Florio, 40 F.3d 
1454, 1463 (3d Cir. 1994). While the Supr eme Court has 
spoken of the "flexible character of the Article III mootness 
doctrine," United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 
388, 400 (1980), it applies where interim events remove the 
effects of the violation that prevent the appellate court from 
granting any relief. In re Cantwell , 639 F.2d 1050, 1053 (3d 
Cir. 1981). 
 
To avoid mootness, a claim must (1) pr esent a real legal 
controversy, (2) genuinely affect an individual, and (3) have 
sufficiently adverse parties. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco 
Int'l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir . 1992); Int'l Bhd. of 
Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1987). If 
the parties have an interest in the outcome of the litigation, 
regardless of size, we have found a live case or controversy 
exists. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 
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435, 442 (1984); Mapco, 983 F.2d at 489. Thus, the case 
will be moot only if it is "impossible for the court to grant 
any effectual relief." Chur ch of Scientology of Cal. v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (citation and internal quotes 
omitted); In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 235 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 
For constitutional mootness to apply, the physicians 
must have raised no claim on which relief could be granted. 
We believe relief may be available her e. If assignment of 
their contracts is vacated, the physicians may have a claim 
for rejection damages.8 Furthermore, the covenants not to 
compete in the physicians' contracts may survive their 
resignations. See In re Klein, 218 B.R. 787 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1998) (holding covenant not to compete in rejected 
franchise agreement remained effective insofar as it was 
enforceable under applicable law); In r e Steaks To Go, Inc., 
226 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding covenants not 
to compete in rejected franchise agreements remained 
enforceable). Moreover, Allegheny General Hospital belies its 
own mootness argument by unequivocally stating its 
intention to enforce the noncompetition clauses. See supra 
note 7. Because potential contractual obligations and 
damages claims remain, we hold the physicians' claims are 
not constitutionally moot. 
 
III. 
 
STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
 
As noted, the trustee assumed the physician contracts 
and then assigned them to Allegheny General Hospital. The 
physicians appeal the assignment. Before addr essing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See Br. of appellees (The Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance 
and Allegheny General Hospital) at 21 ("[T]he only alternative to 
assumption was rejection. Rejection would have given rise to significant 
damages claims in accordance with S 365(g)."). Under S 365(g), rejection 
of an executory contract constitutes a breach immediately before the 
date of filing for bankruptcy and creates a pre-petition claim for breach 
of contract. Nevertheless, rejection does not affect the parties' 
substantive rights under the contract. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy PP 365.09, 
365.09[1] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1999). 
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legal issues raised by the assignment, we briefly review the 
relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
A. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 365 
 
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the 
trustee to assume or reject executory contracts, enabling 
"the trustee to maximize the value of the debtor's estate by 
assuming executory contracts . . . that benefit the estate 
and rejecting those that do not." L.R.S.C. Co. v. Rickel Home 
Centers (In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc.), 209 F.3d 291, 298 
(3d Cir. 2000); see also 11 U.S.C.S 365(a) ("[T]he trustee, 
subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."). It 
also permits the trustee to cure certain defaults before 
assumption and to provide adequate assurance of future 
performance of contracts in default. 11 U.S.C. 
SS 365(b)(1)(A), (B). If the trustee meets the assumption 
requirements under S 365, it must assume the executory 
contract entirely.9 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 
513, 531 (1984); Rickel, 209 F.3d at 298. 
 
Once the trustee assumes an executory contract,S 365 
also authorizes assignment. Generally, the Bankruptcy 
Code supports this right and allows a trustee to assume 
and assign executory contracts regardless of applicable 
laws or contractual provisions restricting assignment. 
Rickel, 209 F.3d at 298-99; In r e Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 
13 F.3d 674, 682 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Section 365(f)(1) was 
designed to prevent anti-alienation or other clauses . . . 
from defeating . . . [the trustee's] ability to realize the full 
value of the debtor's assets."); see also 11 U.S.C. S 365(f)(1) 
("[N]otwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that 
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such 
contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Dr. Cinicola alleges AHERF did not entirely assume and assign his 
contractual obligations. In view of our treatment of statutory mootness, 
we do not reach this claim. 
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lease."). Before an executory contract may be assigned, the 
trustee first must assume the contract and "adequate 
assurance of future performance" of the contract must be 
provided. 11 U.S.C. SS 365(f)(2)(A), (B). This requirement 
provides needed protection to the non-debtor party because 
the assignment relieves the trustee and the bankruptcy 
estate from liability for breaches arising after the 
assignment.10 See 11 U.S.C. S 365(k); Rickel, 209 F.3d at 
299. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The term "adequate assurance of future performance" is not defined 
in the Bankruptcy Code but is included in S 365(b)(1)(C) and 
S 365(f)(2)(B). Section 365(b) requir es adequate assurance of future 
performance of an executory contract when a debtor seeks to assume an 
executory contract on which it has defaulted. This protection is also 
required when a debtor seeks to assign an executory contract under 
S 365(f). Under either section, the definition of the term "should be 
generally the same." Don Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired 
Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, Minn. L. Rev. 341, 362 (1980). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit hasfleshed out the definition 
of "adequate assurance" and concluded: 
 
       [A]dequate assurance of future performance" are not words of art; 
       the legislative history of the [Bankruptcy] Code shows that they 
were 
       intended to be given a practical, pragmatic construction. 
 
       The phrase first appears in the legislation pr oposed by the 
       Commission on Bankruptcy Laws . . . . 
 
       The Commission Report explains the language "adequate assurance 
       of future performance" as follows: 
 
       The language `is adopted from Unifor m Commercial Code S 2- 
       609(1).' What constitutes . . . `adequate assurance of future 
       performance' must be determined by consideration of the facts of 
       the proposed assumption. Cf. Official Comment 4 to Uniform 
       Commercial Code S 2-609 (1972 Edition). It is not intended, 
       however, that any non-debtor party should acquire greater rights 
       in a case under the act than he has outside the act." Report of the 
       Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. 
       No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II 156-57 (1973). 
 
       Section 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code, from which the 
       bankruptcy statute borrows its critical language, provides that 
       "when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the 
       performance of either party, the other may in writing demand 
       adequate assurance of future perfor mance . . . ." The Commentaries 
       to the Code note that " `adequate' assurance is to be `defined by 
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There are other protections as well. Section 365(c) places 
constraints on the assignment rights created under S 365(f) 
and prohibits the assumption or assignment of an 
executory contract if applicable nonbankruptcy law would 
excuse the other party "from accepting per formance from or 
rendering performance to" someone other than the debtor.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       commercial rather than legal standards.' " Official Comment 3 to 
       Uniform Commercial Code S 2-609 (1972 Ed.). What constitutes 
       "adequate assurance" is to be determined by factual conditions; the 
       seller must exercise good faith and observe commercial standards; 
       his satisfaction must be based upon reason and must not be 
       arbitrary and capricious. 
 
Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1309-10 
(5th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 5 B.R. 412, 420-21 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980)); see also In re Carlisle Homes, Inc., 103 B.R. 
524, 538 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) ("The phrase`adequate assurance of 
future performance,' adopted fr om section 2-609(1) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, is to be given a practical, pragmatic construction 
based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Although no 
single solution will satisfy every case, the r equired assurance will fall 
considerably short of an absolute guarantee of per formance.") (citations 
omitted). 
 
11. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir cuit has characterized the 
interaction between these two sections as, "WhatS 365(f)(1) appears to 
give, S 365(c)(1)(A) seems to take away." In re Claremont Acquisition 
Corp., 
Inc., 113 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir. 1997). While S 365(f) creates a broad 
right of assignment, S 365(c) reins it in. Section 365(f)(1) provides: 
 
       Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, 
notwithstanding 
       a provision in an executory contract or unexpir ed lease of the 
       debtor, or in applicable law, that pr ohibits, restricts, or 
conditions 
       the assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign 
       such contract or lease . . . . 
 
And, the relevant exception to this authority in S 365(c) provides: 
 
       The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or 
       unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or 
lease 
       prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of 
duties, if 
       -- 
 
       (1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to 
       such contract or lease from accepting per formance from or 
       rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the 
       debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease 
       prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of 
duties. 
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11 U.S.C. S 365(c)(1)(A). In other wor ds, if a contract could 
not be assigned under applicable law, it may not be 
assumed or assigned by the trustee. 3 Collier on 
Bankruptcy P 365.06[1]. But if the other party consents--in 
this case, the physicians--the trustee may assume and 
assign the contract. 11 U.S.C. S 365(c)(1)(B). 12 
 
B. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 363 
 
For sales in bankruptcy, S 363 authorizes the trustee to 
use, sell, or lease property of the estate outside the 
ordinary course of business after providing notice and 
hearing. 11 U.S.C. S 363(b)(1). The Bankruptcy Code 
broadly defines the property of the bankruptcy estate to 
include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. 
S 541(a)(1). Executory contracts and leases also fall under 
this definition. Rickel, 209 F.3d at 303; Krebs Chrysler- 
Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 498 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
To promote certainty and finality in bankruptcy sales, 
S 363(m) prohibits the reversal of a sale to a good faith 
purchaser of bankruptcy estate property if a party failed to 
obtain a stay of the sale.13 The statute provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. 11 U.S.C. S 365(c) provides in r elevant part: 
 
       The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or 
       unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or 
lease 
       prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of 
duties, if 
       -- 
 
       * * * 
 
       (1)(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or 
       assignment. 
 
13. We have recognized that "section 363(m) fosters the `policy of not 
only affording finality to the judgment of the bankruptcy court, but 
particularly to give finality to those orders and judgments upon which 
third parties rely.' " Pittsburgh Food & Beverage, Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 
F.3d 
645, 647-48 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In r e Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 
788 
F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
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       The reversal or modification on appeal of an 
       authorization . . . of a sale or lease of pr operty does not 
       affect the validity of a sale or lease under such 
       authorization to an entity that purchased or leased 
       such property in good faith, whether or not such entity 
       knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such 
       authorization and such sale or lease were stayed 
       pending appeal. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 363(m). 
 
The provision's blunt finality is harsh but its certainty 
attracts investors and helps effectuate debtor rehabilitation. 
See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy P 363.11. Nevertheless, we have 
rejected a per se rule "mooting appeals absent a stay of the 
sale . . . at issue." Krebs, 141 F .3d at 498 (holding failure 
to obtain stay of order approving sale of executory contracts 
by debtor rendered appeal moot because any remedy would 
affect sale). Instead, we require the satisfaction of two 
conditions before an appeal becomes moot underS 363(m): 
"(1) the underlying sale or lease must not have been stayed 
pending appeal, and (2) reversing or modifying the 
authorization to sell would affect the validity of the sale or 
lease." Rickel, 209 F.3d at 298 (holding failure to obtain 
stay order approving sale of leases by debtor rendered 
appeal moot); cf. Pittsburgh Food & Beverage, 112 F.3d at 
649 (holding appeal of bankruptcy sale moot because court 
could not grant effective relief). 
 
IV. 
 
STATUTORY MOOTNESS 
 
The trustee and the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare 
Alliance contend the physicians' appeal is statutorily moot 
because the assignment of the physicians' contracts 
triggered the protection of S 363(m). In support, appellees 
rely on our recent decisions in In r e Rickel Home Centers, 
Inc., 209 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2000), and Krebs Chrysler- 
Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 
1998), which, they argue, require pr ocuring a stay pending 
appeal to avoid mootness when an assignment and sale are 
authorized under SS 363 and 365. 
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First we must examine whether S 363(m) applies to the 
assignment of the physician contracts to Allegheny General 
Hospital and the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare 
Alliance's subsequent substitution as the sole member of 
Allegheny General Hospital. Rickel, 209 F .3d at 300; In re 
Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (3d Cir. 1990). 
In other words, we must decide whether AHERF 's 
assumption and assignment of these executory contracts to 
Allegheny General Hospital, which was later sold to the 
Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance, remain 
exclusively under the scope of S 365 or trigger the 
protection of S 363(m) as well. 
 
A. 
 
To recapitulate, although the Bankruptcy Court 
authorized the assignment of the physicians' contracts to 
Allegheny General Hospital under the Second Or der (issued 
July 29, 1999), the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare 
Alliance gained control of several AHERF affiliates, 
including Allegheny General Hospital, under the authority 
of the First Order (issued July 23, 1999). Entered under 
S 363 and S 365, the First Order authorized the substitution 
of the Western Pennsylvania Healthcar e Alliance for AHERF 
as the controlling member of Allegheny General Hospital. 
See Order Approving Settlement Agr eement on July 23, 
1999. As noted, AHERF initially intended to assign the 
contracts directly to the Wester n Pennsylvania Healthcare 
Alliance. When the physicians objected, the Bankruptcy 
Court permitted the trustee to orally amend the settlement 
agreement to assign the physicians' contracts to Allegheny 
General Hospital. This amendment enabled the trustee and 
the Western Pennsylvania Healthcar e Alliance to achieve 
through a change of control what they could not 
accomplish through direct assignment. The physicians 
contend the amendment was improper. But we need not 
decide whether this maneuver invalidated the assignment. 
Assuming the assignment was invalid, the physicians may 
have failed to perfect their right to appeal. 
 
The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors with br oad 
authority to assume and assign executory contracts, which 
we have defined as "a contract under which the obligation 
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of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract 
are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete 
performance would constitute a material breach excusing 
the performance of the other." In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 
50 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Sharon Steel Corp. 
v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 
1989)).14 Neither party disputes the executory nature of the 
physicians' employment contracts. Moreover , S 365 permits 
the debtor to assume and assign executory contracts the 
trustee deems advantageous. 11 U.S.C. S 365(f)(1); 2 Norton 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice S 39:1 (W illiam L. Norton Jr. 
ed., 2d ed. 1997). Although assignment requir es the 
satisfaction of certain conditions, the Bankruptcy Code 
"favors free assignability." Rickel , 209 F.3d at 299. 
 
In addition, S 363 enables the debtor to sell property of 
the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. S 363; 2 Norton 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice S 37:1. The br oad definition of 
property of the bankruptcy estate encompasses"all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor," and includes executory 
contracts. 11 U.S.C. S 541(a)(1); see also Rickel, 209 F.3d at 
303; Krebs, 141 F.3d at 498; 2 Norton Bankruptcy Law and 
Practice S 37:16. Once the debtor sells its property, S 363(m) 
prohibits reversing a sale when a party fails to obtain a stay 
pending appeal, unless vacating or modifying the sale 
would not affect its validity. 11 U.S.C. S 363(m); Krebs, 141 
F.3d at 499. 
 
We first explored the relationship between S 363 and 
S 365 in Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 
F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1998). In Kr ebs, we found an assumption 
of executory contracts implicated the mootness pr otection 
of a sale under S 363(m) when a bankrupt automobile 
dealer sought authorization to assume and sell certain 
franchise agreements. After winning an auction to purchase 
the assumed franchise agreements from the debtor, Krebs, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 
756 
F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985) (adopting executory contracts definition 
propounded by Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 
Part I, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 
(1986); see also Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 522 n.6 (1984) (characterizing 
executory contracts as contracts on which per formance is due on both 
sides based on legislative history). 
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another automobile dealer, refused to pay the bankruptcy 
estate. The bankruptcy court then order ed him to close on 
the sale, and, in an effort to avoid this obligation, Krebs 
appealed the debtor's initial assumption of the agr eements 
under S 365 as improper. After the district court affirmed 
the bankruptcy court's order, we held Kr ebs's appeal moot 
under S 363(m). Finding the executory contracts constituted 
property of the estate under S 541 of the Bankruptcy Code 
and Pennsylvania law, we also concluded that " assignments 
of franchises under section 365 are also sales of estate 
property subject to section 363(m) . . . . Therefore, section 
363(m) governs the sale of the franchises her e, 
notwithstanding that section 365 applies to the particular 
mechanics of conveyance." Krebs, 141 F.3d at 497-98 
(emphasis added). To state it another way, the sale of an 
executory contract triggers the protections af forded sales of 
bankruptcy estate property but also requir es satisfaction of 
the requirements for assuming and/or assigning the same 
executory contract. Rickel, 209 F.3d at 302 n.11. In a 
subsequent case regarding the assignment and sale of 
leases by a debtor in bankruptcy, we reaffir med the 
rationale in Krebs. Id. at 300. 
 
There is a nexus between S 363 and S 365. One court 
explained their correspondence: 
 
       Even though assignments of executory contracts ar e 
       governed by S 365 and not by the mor e general S 363 
       sales provision, assignments are in fact just a type of 
       sale. Instead of purchasing or leasing pr operty, 
       transactions governed by S 363, an assignee purchases 
       a lease. A good faith assignee, therefor e stands in the 
       same shoes as a good faith purchaser and as an 
       innocent third party depends on the finality of 
       bankruptcy orders to the same extent as good faith 
       purchasers.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. As Judge Sloviter has pointed out, "[T]he same policy concerns are 
equally applicable to lease assignments and to sales or leases or 
property. Assignment of a lease is, after all, simply the purchase of a 
right to lease property." Slocum, 922 F.2d at 1096 (Sloviter, J., 
dissenting). 
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Comco Assocs., SPA 77k L.P. v. Faraldi Food Indus. Ltd., 
170 B.R. 765, 769 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 
Under Krebs, 141 F.3d at 498-99 (executory contracts), and 
Rickel, 209 F.3d at 301-02 (lease contracts), a party need 
only obtain a stay pending appeal when the debtor r eceives 
authorization to assign and sell executory contracts or 
leases under both S 363 and S 365. If there is no sale of the 
assigned property, S 363 will not apply. See Slocum, 922 
F.2d at 1085 (refusing to requir e parties to obtain a stay 
when only S 365 implicated). 
 
Other courts have not explicitly extended S 363(m)'s 
reach to assignments under S 365, but they have embraced 
our interpretation of statutory mootness and found cases 
moot for similar reasons. Rickel, 209 F .3d at 304 
(discussing cases). For example, in In r e Adamson Co. Inc., 
159 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 1998), a bankrupt steel tank 
manufacturer sought to sell its assets and assign the lease 
on its manufacturing plant to a shareholder . The landlord 
objected, but failed to seek a stay of the bankruptcy court's 
order authorizing the assignment. The Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held the case moot because the 
leasehold was personal property that trigger ed the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The synonymous definitions of assignment and sale add further weight 
for considering the terms together. An assignment is by definition: 
 
       [The] act of transferring to another all or part of one's property 
       interest, or rights. A transfer or making over to another of the 
whole 
       of any property, real or persona, in possession or in action, or of 
any 
       estate or right therein. It includes transfers of all kinds of 
property, 
       including negotiable instruments. The transfer by a party of all of 
its 
       rights to some kind of property, usually intangible property such 
as 
       rights in a lease, mortgage, agreement of sale or a partnership. 
       Tangible property is more often transferred by possession and by 
       instruments conveying title such as a deed or a bill of sale. 
 
Black's Law Dictionary 119 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). 
 
A sale by definition is a "revenue transaction where goods or services 
are delivered to a customer in retur n for cash or a contractual 
obligation 
to pay. Term comprehends transfer of property from one party to another 
for valuable recompense." Id. at 1337. 
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protection of S 363(m).16 Id. at 898. Also, in Comco Assocs., 
SPA 77k L.P. v. Faraldi Food Indus. Ltd., 170 B.R. 765 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994), where a bankrupt meat market assigned 
its property leases, the district court dismissed the lessor's 
appeal because "any appeal of a consummated assignment 
pursuant to S 365 must be dismissed as moot."17 170 B.R. 
at 770. The Court of Appeals for the First Cir cuit extended 
S 363(m)'s mootness protection to assignments 
fundamentally intertwined with a S 363 sale in In re 
Stadium Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1990). Holding 
the assignment of a professional football team's stadium 
sublease together with the purchase of r elated assets was 
protected by S 363(m), the court concluded S 363(m) would 
apply to transactions in which the "assignment of the 
[executory contract] was integral to the sale and removing 
it from the sale would . . . adversely af fect[ ] the terms of 
the sale." Id. at 849. 
 
The trustee contends that "the transaction consummated 
pursuant to the Global Settlement Agreement, including the 
assumption and assignment of the Contracts by the trustee 
to AGH [(Allegheny General Hospital)]" involves both SS 365 
and 363 because of the settlement agreement's"hybrid 
nature." Br. of appellee (Trustee) at 13. Invoking S 363 and 
S 365 in its First Order, the Bankruptcy Court authorized 
the transactions contemplated by the settlement agr eement. 
See Bankruptcy Order of July 23, 1999. As noted, the 
Bankruptcy Court's First Order authorizing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir cuit found the protection of 
S 363(m) applied to a bankruptcy court or der "permitting the assumption 
and assignment of leases . . . [that also] pr ovided authorization for the 
trustee's sale [of the leases]," overtur ning the decision of the 
Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel to void the assignment, because the assigned leases were 
sold and no stay pending appeal was obtained. In re Exennium, Inc., 715 
F.2d 1401, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 
17. The district court based its decision on the reasoning presented by 
the dissent in Slocum which stated, "[W]ell-established rules of 
justiciability found in the cases of this court and others, along with the 
particular need of finality in bankruptcy, r equire that we find the 
appeal 
of a completed lease assignment to a non-party moot unless the 
appellant has sought a stay pending appeal." 922 F.2d at 1093 (Sloviter, 
J., dissenting). 
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implementation of the settlement agreement deferred action 
on the physicians' contracts,18 and the Second Order 
addressed only the assumption and assignment of the 
physicians' contracts under S 365. (See  Bankruptcy Order 
of July 29, 1999). Nonetheless, it is clear the Bankruptcy 
Court intended its Second Order to operate in conjunction 
with its First Order. See T ranscript of Bankruptcy Hearing, 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Wester n District of 
Pennsylvania, July 29, 1999, at 17. Although the 
physicians argue the Second Order r epresented an 
independent act, authorized solely under S 365, we are 
convinced the assumption and assignment of the physician 
contracts were inextricably intertwined with AHERF 's sale 
of assets to the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance. 
Because the assignment here involved a sale under S 363 
and the First Order was authorized under S 363 and S 365, 
the mootness provision of S 363(m) applies to the 
assignment of the physicians' contracts.19  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The Bankruptcy Order of July 23, 1999 pr ovides: 
 
       Notwithstanding anything in this Settlement Or der, the Global 
       Settlement Agreement or any exhibits or schedules thereto, nothing 
       in this Settlement Order or any exhibit her eto shall be deemed to 
(a) 
       in any way affect, including without limitation, authorizing the 
       assumption, assumption and assignment or rejection of any 
       agreement, including without limitation any executory contract or 
       expired lease between any of AUH-East, AHC, or the Debtors on the 
       one hand, and . . . any of the objecting doctor gr oup represented 
by 
       Kabal & Geeseman on the other hand . . . . The disposition of any 
       such agreement, including without limitation any executory 
       contracts . . . between any of AUH-East, or the Debtors, on the one 
       hand and any of . . . the objecting doctor gr oup represented by 
       Kabal & Geeseman on the other hand . . . shall be determined by 
       separate order(s) of this Court. 
 
Bankruptcy Order of July 23, 1999 at P 27. 
 
19. The physicians' characterization of the Bankruptcy Court's orders as 
effecting a double assignment of their contracts forms the basis of their 
claim that only S 365 should govern our analysis. By approving the 
assignment of their contracts, they argue, the Bankruptcy Court failed to 
enforce the protections required by S 365. In other words, the physicians 
contend their assignment and transfer from AHERF employers to 
Allegheny General Hospital followed by the substitution of the Western 
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B. 
 
As noted, we have rejected a per se rule which would 
moot every appeal not accompanied by a stay underS 363, 
 
(Text continued on page 23) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance for AHERF r epresented a two-part 
assignment that is invalid under In re W est Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
 
In West, we held S 365(c)(1) created a "hypothetical test" whereby an 
assignment of an executory contract was invalid if precluded by 
applicable law. 852 F.2d at 83. West Electronics had contracted with the 
United States government to produce missile launcher supply units. 
After the company filed for bankruptcy, it sought to assume its contract 
with the government. Relying on a federal statute that prohibited 
assignment of government contracts without its consent, the government 
sought to terminate the contract. See 41 U.S.C. S 15 ("No [government] 
contract . . . or any interest therein, shall be transferred by the part 
to 
whom such contract . . . is given to any other party, any such transfer 
shall cause the annulment of the contract . . . transferred, so far as the 
United States are concerned.") The West court agreed with the 
government and interpreted S 365(c)(1) in this way: 
 
       [I]f non-bankruptcy law provides that the government would have to 
       consent to an assignment of the West Contract to a third party, 
i.e., 
       to someone `other than the debtor or the debtor in possession,' 
then 
       West, as the debtor in possession, cannot assume that contract. 
       This provision limiting assumption of contracts is applicable to 
any 
       contract subject to a legal prohibition against assignment. 
 
852 F.2d at 83. 
 
That is, the "hypothetical test" requir es courts to decide whether, under 
applicable law, assignment to a third party would be forbidden. See In re 
Catapult Entm't, Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir.) (adopting 
"hypothetical test"), cert. dismissed,528 U.S. 924 (1999); In re Catron, 
158 B.R. 629, 638 (E.D. Va. 1993) (same),aff 'd without opinion, 25 F.3d 
1038 (4th Cir. 1994); but see Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 
104 F.3d 489, 493-94 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997); In re 
Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 230 B.R. 693, 705 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) 
(rejecting "hypothetical test"); In r e Lil' Things, Inc., 220 B.R. 583, 
587 
(Bankr. N.D. Texas 1998) (same); Inre GP Express Airlines, Inc., 200 B.R. 
222, 232 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (same); In re American Ship Bldg. Co., 
Inc., 164 B.R. 358, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (same); In re Ontario 
Locomotive & Indus. Ry. Supplies (U.S.) Inc., 126 B.R. 146, 147-48 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y 1991) (same) (or der subsequently vacated on other 
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grounds); see generally Daniel J. Bussel & Edward A. Friedler, The Limits 
on Assuming and Assigning Executory Contracts, 74 Am. Bankr. L.J. 321 
(Summer 2000) (critiquing "hypothetical test"). Citing Pennsylvania law, 
the physicians note that personal service contracts are assignable only 
if the employee "either expressly or implicitly by his conduct consented 
to the assignment." All-Pak, Inc. v. Johnston , 694 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997). Because the choice of law clause in each of their 
contracts specified Pennsylvania law, the physicians claim the 
protections in S 365(c) apply. 
 
Notwithstanding the common law assignment rule in Pennsylvania, the 
physicians' contracts permitted AHERF to assign their contracts to any 
AHERF subsidiary without their consent. The physicians' employment 
agreements generally provided that "[t]his Agreement . . . may be 
assigned and delegated . . . to AHERF, or to any other subsidiary of 
AHERF, provided that AUHS [Allegheny University of the Health 
Sciences] shall remain liable for its obligations under this Agreement in 
the event of such assignment." (other contracts contained the same 
language except "MCP-HU" (Medical College of Pennsylvania-Hahnemann 
University) is substituted for "AUHS"). As noted, the original settlement 
agreement initially proposed assigning the physicians' contracts directly 
to the Western Pennsylvania Healthcar e Alliance, the Allegheny Medical 
Practice Network or the Allegheny Specialty Practice Network. But this 
would have violated the assignment provisions in the physicians' 
contracts, because none of these organizations was affiliated with 
AHERF. As noted, the Bankruptcy Court authorized the trustee to orally 
amend the Settlement Agreement and assign the contracts to Allegheny 
General Hospital, an AHERF subsidiary, befor e the Western 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance assumed AHERF 's controlling position 
as Allegheny General Hospital's sole member. For this reason, the 
physicians argue the assignment by AHERF of their contracts to 
Allegheny General Hospital, which the Wester n Pennsylvania Healthcare 
Alliance subsequently acquired, repr esents a disingenuous, two-step 
assignment intended to indirectly accomplish what the Bankruptcy Code 
and their employment contracts prohibited. Relying on the "hypothetical 
test" established in West, the physicians contend this circuitous 
"assignment" to Alliance is invalid. Because Pennsylvania law permits 
assignment of personal service contracts only with employee consent-- 
which AHERF allegedly did not obtain--the physicians contend the 
assignment should be vacated. 
 
Although the settlement agreement was amended to avoid violating 
AHERF 's contractual duties to the physicians, the Western Pennsylvania 
Healthcare Alliance maintains the trustee lawfully assigned the 
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and formulated a two-prong test for mootness: (1) whether 
the underlying sale was stayed pending appeal, and (2) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
physicians' contracts to Allegheny General Hospital. The Western 
Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance points out that the physicians 
contractually consented to assignment of their contracts to any AHERF 
affiliate. The Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance also maintains it 
obtained the physicians' contracts when it lawfully acquired control over 
Allegheny General Hospital. Hence there was no second assignment. In 
support, the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance cites Institut 
Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
521 U.S. 1120 (1997), and abrogated on other grounds, Hardemon v. City 
of Boston, No. 97-2010, 1998 WL 148382, at *1 (1st Cir. April 6, 1998). 
 
In Institut Pasteur, the debtor sought assumption of a patent license 
agreement and confirmation of a plan to transfer the debtor's stock to an 
entity that directly competed with the patent's licensor. The licensor 
argued the stock transfer represented a de facto assignment in violation 
of S 365(c)'s applicable law exception toS 365(f), because patents are 
presumed unassignable under federal common law. See Institut Pasteur, 
104 F.3d at 490-91. In rejecting the licensor's claim and permitting the 
transfer, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the 
"hypothetical test" for assignments followed by some circuits, including 
our own. Id. at 493. The court found that the debtor corporation 
represented the same entity with which the licensor had originally 
contracted and, therefore, the debtor could not be prohibited from 
assuming the patent under federal law. Id. at 493-94. Because the 
license agreement did not contain a "change in control" provision in the 
license agreement between Institut Pasteur and Cambridge Biotech 
Corporation, the court found the transfer could not be prevented. Id. at 
494. 
 
The court adopted an "actual perfor mance test" necessitating a "case- 
by-case inquiry into whether the nondebtor . . . was being forced to 
accept performance under its executory contract from someone other 
than the debtor party with whom it originally contracted." Id. at 493 
(internal quotations omitted). The Western Pennsylvania Healthcare 
Alliance argues its control of Allegheny General Hospital did not alter 
the 
physicians original contractual obligations, because their employment 
contracts provided for their assignment to Allegheny General Hospital. 
Moreover, it contends its purchase of AHERF 's assets, which included 
the physicians' contracts, is analogous to the stock transfer in Institut 
Pasteur. Yet the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare Alliance's analysis 
would seem to rest on the application of an"actual performance test" 
which would be at odds with the "hypothetical test" adopted by our 
circuit. 
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whether a reversal or modification of the authorization to 
sell would affect the validity of the sale. Krebs, 141 F.3d at 
499.20 The only matter at issue then is whether any relief 
can be fashioned for the physicians that would not affect 
the validity of the sale. In Krebs, we recognized that 
allowing a debtor to reject an executory contract after it had 
been assumed and sold "would have an impact on the 
validity of the . . . sale . . . because [it] . . . would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Whichever interpretation best serves S 365(c), we must first answer the 
question of statutory mootness before pr oceeding to the merits of the 
physicians' challenge to the assumption and assignment of their 
contracts. Because we find the mootness issue r equires further 
development in the District Court, this case does not require us to 
revisit 
our exegesis of S 365(c). 
 
20. The Krebs court developed this test from an earlier application of 
mootness protection under S 364(e) for obtaining credit or incurring debt 
under S 364. In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 552, 559-63 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (en banc). In Swedeland, the debtor was a developer who 
obtained post-petition loans for a construction pr oject under S 
364(d)(1). 
A pre-petition creditor sought to for eclose on the developer's assets and 
opposed the authorization of further credit for the debtor. When the 
creditor appealed the loan authorizations without obtaining a stay 
pending appeal, we held, "[I]t is impossible to conclude that section 
364(e) in itself requires that an appeal be dismissed if a stay is not 
obtained." Id. at 559. With language that mirrors S 363(m), S 364(e) 
provides: 
 
       The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under 
       this section to obtain credit or incur debt, or of a grant under 
this 
       section of a priority lien, does not affect the validity of any 
debt so 
       incurred, or any priority or lien so granted, to an entity that 
       extended such credit in good faith, whether or not such entity knew 
       of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and the 
       incurring of such debt, or the granting of such priority or lien, 
were 
       stayed pending appeal. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 364(e). 
 
Because S 364(e) and S 363(m) are based on similar language, the Krebs 
court viewed "section S 363(m) through the prism of Swedeland's 
construction of section 364(e)." Krebs , 141 F.3d at 499. This perspective 
provided the basis for the promulgation of the same two-prong test for 
S 363(m) by the Krebs court. 
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necessarily require reversing the subsequent assumption 
and assignment of the underlying [executory contracts]. 
Clearly, this remedy is not permitted by section 363(m)." Id. 
 
In the District Court, the physicians requested reversal of 
the assumption and assignment of their employment 
contracts as well as a declaration of nonassignability. As 
noted, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's 
order without opinion and without addressing mootness. 
Consequently, the District Court did not examine the effect, 
if any, vacating or modifying the assumption and 
assignment order would have on the sale between AHERF 
and the Western Pennsylvania Healthcar e Alliance. For this 
reason, we will vacate the order of the District Court and 
remand this matter to allow it to consider whether the 
requested relief would affect the validity of the transaction 
between AHERF and the Western Pennsylvania Healthcare 
Alliance. Whether our jurisprudence permits the 
assignment of the physicians' contracts, and, if so, whether 
the assignment satisfied the requirements of S 365 cannot 
be addressed until mootness is resolved. If the District 
Court finds reversing or modifying the assignment would 
not affect the validity of the sale, then the court must 
determine both issues. 
 
V. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated, we will vacate the or der of the 
District Court and remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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